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Abstract  
The new E.U. proposal for a general data protection regulation has been 
introduced to give an answer to the challenges of the evolving digital 
environment. In some cases, these expectations could be disappointed, since the 
proposal is still based on the traditional main pillars of the last generation of data 
protection laws.  
In the field of consumer data protection, these pillars are the purpose 
specification principle, the use limitation principle and the “notice and consent” 
model. Nevertheless, the complexity of data processing, the power of modern 
analytics and the “transformative” use of personal information drastically limit 
the awareness of consumers, their capability to evaluate the various consequences 
of their choices and to give a free and informed consent.  
To respond to the above, it is necessary to clarify the rationale of the “notice and 
consent” paradigm, looking back to its origins and assessing its effectiveness in a 
world of predictive analytics. From this perspective, the paper considers the 
historical evolution of data protection and how the fundamental issues coming 
from the technological and socio-economic contexts have been addressed by 
regulations.  
On the basis of this analysis, the author suggests a revision of the “notice and 
consent” model focused on the opt-in and proposes the adoption of a different 
approach when, such as in Big Data collection, the data subject cannot be totally 
aware of the tools of analysis and their potential output. 
For this reason, the author sustains the provision of a subset of rules for Big Data 
analytics, which is based on a multiple impact assessment of data processing, on 
a deeper level of control by data protection authorities, and on the different opt-
out model. 
 
Keywords: data protection, consent, data protection impact assessment, big data, 
data protection authorities 
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1. Introduction 
In the last few years, the debate surrounding data protection and privacy has 
focused on the future wave of new regulations. Driven by the Web 2.0 
environment and the economy of data,1 private companies and governments have 
become even more data-centric. However, the high demand for personal 
information, the complexity of the new tools of analysis and the increasing 
numbers of sources of data collection,2 have generated an environment in which 
the “data barons” (i.e. big companies, government agencies, intermediaries)3 have 
a control over digital information which is no longer counterbalanced by the 
user’s self-determination.4  
Nevertheless, all the ongoing proposals for a reform of data protection 
regulations, both in the U.S.5 and Europe,6 are still focused on the traditional main 
                                                          
1 On the economic value of personal information, see Ian Brown, ‘The economics of privacy, 
data protection and surveillance’ in J.M. Bauer and M. Latzer (eds.) Research Handbook on the 
Economics of the Internet (Edward Elgar 2014) (forthcoming) 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2358392 accessed 27 February 2014; Joseph 
W. Jerome, ‘Buying and selling privacy: Big Data’s Different Burdens and benefits’ (2013) 66 
Stan. L. Rev. Online 47, 47-49; OECD, ‘Exploring the Economics of Personal Data: A Survey of 
Methodologies for Measuring Monetary  Value’ (2013). OECD Digital Economy Papers, No. 220, 
OECD Publishing http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/docserver/download/5k486qtxldmq.pdf?expires=1403110041&id=id&accname=guest
&checksum=1F20BE8EB6E36BA2F7D94A175C5FB089 accessed 27 February 2014. ENISA, 
‘Study on monetising privacy. An economic model for pricing personal information’ (2012) 
http://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/identity-and-trust/library/deliverables/monetising-privacy 
accessed 27 February 2014. See also Howard J. Beales and Jeffrey A. Eisenach, ‘An Empirical 
Analysis of the Value of Information Sharing in the Market for Online Content’ (2014) Navigant 
Economics http://images.politico.com/global/2014/02/09/beales_eisenach_daa_study.html 
accessed 27 February 2014. 
2 See Luciano Floridi, The 4TH Revolution. How the Infosphere is Reshaping Human Reality 
(OUP 2014) 96 (“the fourth revolution has brought to light the intrinsically informational nature of 
human identity”). 
3  See Viktor Mayer-Schönberger and Kenneth Cukier, Big Data. A Revolution That Will 
Transform How We Live, Work and Think (John Murray 2013) 182; Federal Trade Commission, 
‘Data brokers. A Call for Transparency and Accountability’ (2014) 
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/data-brokers-call-transparency-accountability-
report-federal-trade-commission-may-2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf accessed 25 June 2014. 
See also Alessandro Mantelero and Giuseppe Vaciago, ‘Social media and big data’ in Babak 
Akhgar, Francesca M. Bosco, and Andrew Staniforth (eds), Cyber Crime and Cyber Terrorism 
Investigator's Handbook (Elsevier Science 2014). 
4  Since the articles focuses on consumer data protection, for the purposes of the article, 
consumer, user and data subject are use considered as synonyms. On the right to informational 
self-determination, it is worth mentioning the influential decision adopted by the Federal German 
Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), 15 December 1983, Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift, 1984, 419 
https://www.zensus2011.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Gesetze/Volkszaehlungsurteil_1983.pdf?
__blob=publicationFile&v=9 accessed 25 June 2014. See also Michael A. Froomkin, ‘The Death 
of Privacy?’ (2000) 52(5) Stan. L. Rev. 1461, 1464; Anita L. Allen, ‘Coercing Privacy’ (1999) 40 
(3) Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 723; Paul M. Schwartz, ‘Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace’ (1999) 
52 Vand. L. Rev. 1690, 1661; Jerry Kang, ‘Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions’ 
(1998) 50(4) Stan. L. Rev. 1193, 1203; Alan F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (Atheneum 1967) 
330-399; Charles Fried, ‘Privacy’ (1968) 77 (3) Yale L. J. 475, 482-483. 
5 See The White House, ‘A Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked World: A Framework for 
Protecting Privacy and Promoting Innovation in the Global Digital Economy’ (2012) 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf accessed 25 June 2014, 47-48; The 
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pillars of the so called “fourth generation” of data protection laws.7 In the field of 
consumer data protection, these pillars are the purpose specification principle, the 
use limitation principle and the “notice and consent” model (i.e. an informed, 
freely given and specific consent).8  
                                                                                                                                                               
White House, ‘Executive Office of the President. Big Data: Seizing Opportunities, Preserving 
Values’ (2014) 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/big_data_privacy_report_may_1_2014.pdf 
accessed 25 June 2014, 17-21, 55-57, 60-61. See also Daniel J. Solove, ‘Introduction: Privacy 
Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma’ (2013) 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1880; Julie E. Cohen, 
‘Between Truth and Power’ in Mireille Hildebrandt and Bibi van den Berg (eds), Freedom and 
Property of Information: The Philosophy of Law Meets the Philosophy of Technology (Routledge) 
(forthcoming) http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=234645910-11 accessed 25 June 
2014. 
6 See Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data 
(General Data Protection Regulation), COM(2012) 11 final, Brussels, 25 January 2012 (hereinafter 
abbreviated as PGDPR) http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf accessed 27 February 2014; Proposal for a 
regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individual with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data 
Protection Regulation), (COM(2012)0011 – C7 0025/2012 – 2012/0011(COD)), compromise 
amendments on Articles 1-29 and on Articles 30-91 (hereinafter abbreviated as PGDPR-LIBE) 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/libe/dv/comp_am_art_01-
29/comp_am_art_01-29en.pdf and 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/libe/dv/comp_am_art_30-
91/comp_am_art_30-91en.pdf accessed 27 February 2014. In March 2014 the LIBE text was voted 
and approved by the whole Parliament 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2014-
0212&language=EN accessed 25 March 2014 
7 See Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, ‘Generational development of data protection in Europe’ in 
Philip E. Agre, Marc Rotenberg (eds), Technology and privacy: The new landscape (MIT Press 
1997) 219-241. 
8 See art. 2 (h), Directive 95/46/EC and art. 4 (8) PGDPR-LIBE (“ 'the data subject's consent' 
means any freely given specific, informed and explicit indication of his or her wishes by which the 
data subject, either by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to personal 
data relating to them being processed;”). Although the Directive does not recognize the consent as 
the principal or preeminent legal ground for data processing, it should be noted that the five other 
grounds require a “necessity” test, which strictly limits the cases in which they can be applied. See 
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 15/2011 on the definition of consent’, adopted 
on 13 July 2011, 7 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2011/wp187_en.pdf, 
accessed 27 February 2014; see also Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 06/2014 
on the notion of legitimate interests of the data controller under Article 7 of Directive 95/46/EC’, 
adopted on 9 April 2014, 11, 23-32 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-
29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2014/wp217_en.pdf accessed 27 February 2014. 
See also above at n 4; Brendan Van Alsenoy, Eleni Kosta and Jos Dumortier, ‘Privacy notices 
versus informational self-determination: Minding the gap’ (2014) 28 (2) Int. Rev. Law, Comp. & 
Tech. 185, 188; Viktor Mayer-Schönberger (n 7) 229-234; European Commission, Directorate-
General Justice, Freedom and Security, ‘Comparative study on different approaches to new 
privacy challenges, in particular in the light of technological developments: Working Paper No.2: 
Data protection laws in the EU. The difficulties in meeting challenges posed by global social and 
technical developments’ (2010) 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/studies/new_privacy_challenges/final_report_wor
king_paper_2_en.pdf accessed 5 July 2014; Roder Brownsword, ‘Consent in Data Protection Law: 
Privacy, Fair Processing and Confidentiality’ in Serge Gutwirth, Yves Poullet, Paul De Hert, 
Cécile de Terwangne and Sjaak Nouwt, Reinventing data protection? (Springer 2009) 83-110. 
Differently, in the U.S., the traditional approach based on various sectorial regulations has 
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As it will be explained below in Section 4, this kind of approach seems to be 
inadequate in the present context9, where the “transformative”10 use of Big Data 
makes often impossible to explain the description of all the possible uses of 
information at the time of its initial collection.  
Moreover, the digital world is characterized by an asymmetric distribution of 
the control over information, in terms of access to relevant, valued, and reliable 
data and in terms of ability to use it. In this sense, the control over the information 
derived from predictive analytics is not accessible to everyone, as it is based on 
the availability of large data sets, expensive technologies, and specific human 
skills to develop sophisticated systems of analysis and interpretation.11 
Finally, in our digital economy, consumers often accept not having an effective 
negotiation of their personal information, due to market concentration 12  and 
related social and technological lock-ins.13 The social lock-in effect is one of the 
consequences of the dominant position held by some big players and is evident in 
the social networks market. It is the incentive to remain on a network, given the 
numbers of connections and social relationships created and managed by the user 
                                                                                                                                                               
underestimated the role played by user’s choice, adopting a market-oriented strategy. Nevertheless 
the recent guidelines adopted by the U.S. administrations seem to suggest a different approach, 
reinforcing self-determination. See The White House, ‘A Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked 
World: A Framework for Protecting Privacy and Promoting Innovation in the Global Digital 
Economy’ (n 5) 47-48. On the U.S. “notice and choice” regime, see also Neil M. Richards and 
Jonathan H. King, ‘Big Data Ethics’ (forthcoming 2014), Wake Forest Law Review, draft version, 
January 2014, 25 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2384174 accessed 25 June 
2014; Paul Ohm, ‘Branding Privacy’ (2013) 97 Minn. L. Rev. 907, 929-930; Lorrie F. Cranor, 
‘Necessary but not sufficient: standardized mechanisms for privacy and choice’ (2012) 10 J. on 
Telecom & High Tech L. 273. 
9 See Fred H. Cate, Mayer‐Schönberger, Viktor, ‘Data Use and Impact. Global Workshop’ 
(2013) iii http://cacr.iu.edu/sites/cacr.iu.edu/files/Use_Workshop_Report.pdf accessed 27 February 
2014 (“The technologies and data applications of the 21st century are rapidly combining to make 
data  protection based on notice and choice irrelevant”); Ira S. Rubinstein, ‘Big Data: The End of 
Privacy or a New Beginning?’ (2013) Int’l Data Privacy L., 3 (2), 74; Marc Rotenberg, ‘Fair 
Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn’t Get)’ (2001) Stan. 
Tech. L. Rev. 1, paras. 29-32 https://journals.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/stanford-
technology-law-review/online/rotenberg-fair-info-practices.pdf accessed 20 December 2013. 
10 See Omer Tene and Jules Polonetsky, ‘Privacy in the Age of Big Data: A Time for Big 
Decisions’ (2012) Stan. L. Rev. Online 64. Big Data analytics make possible to collect a large 
amount of information from different sources and to analyse it in order to identify new trends and 
correlations in data sets. This analysis can be conducted to pursue purposes not defined in 
advance, related to the emerging correlations and different from the purposes of the initial 
collection. 
11 See Alessandro Mantelero, ‘Social Control, Transparency, and Participation in the Big Data 
World’ (2014) Journal of Internet Law, April, 23-29. On privacy and control over information see 
Westin (n 4) 7; Arthur R. Miller, The Assault on Privacy Computers, Data Banks, Dossiers 
(University of Michigan Press 1971) 25; Daniel J. Solove, Understanding Privacy (Harvard 
University Press 2008) 24-29; Cohen, ‘Between Truth and Power’ (n 5) 1, 5. 
12  See Science and Technology Options Assessment, ‘Potential and Impacts of Cloud 
Computing Services and Social Network Websites’ (2014) 94-99, 116-121 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2014/513546/IPOL-
JOIN_ET%282014%29513546_EN.pdf accessed 27 February 2014. 
13 See also Spiros Simitis, ‘Reviewing privacy in an information society’ (1987) 135(3) Pen. L. 
Rev., 707, 737 (“the value of a regulatory doctrine such as "informed consent" depends entirely on 
the social and economic context of the individual activity”); Schwartz, ‘Privacy and Democracy in 
Cyberspace’ (n 4) 1661-1662. 
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of a social networking platform. This lock-in intrinsically limits the user's 
possibility to recreate the same network elsewhere. The different technological 
lock-in is related to technological standards and data formats that are adopted by 
service providers. This lock-in effect limits data portability and migration from 
one service to another that offers the same functions. 
For these reasons, it is necessary to re-consider the existing data protection 
legal framework with regard to the “notice and consent” model and define new 
models, which better address the various issues of the present and future digital 
environment.  
Different proposals have been advanced by legal scholars and computer 
scientists, which focus on privacy by design,14 contextual privacy,15 differential 
privacy, 16 data uses17 and other combined solutions. Nevertheless, many of these 
                                                          
14 See Ann Cavoukian, ‘Privacy by design. From rhetoric to reality’ (2014) 12-18, 65-100 
http://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/PbDBook-From-Rhetoric-to-Reality.pdf accessed 27 
February 2014; Ann Cavoukian, ‘Privacy by Design: Leadership, Methods, and Results’ in Serge 
Gutwirth, Ronald Leenes, Paul De Hert, Yves Poullet (eds), European Data Protection: Coming of 
Age (Springer 2013) 175-202; Ann Cavoukian, ‘Privacy by Design: Origins, Meaning, and 
Prospects for Assuring Privacy and Trust in the Information Era’ in Yee, G O M (ed), Privacy 
Protection Measures and Technologies in Business Organizations: Aspects and Standards (IGI 
Global 2012) 170-208; Ira S. Rubenstein, ‘Regulating Privacy By Design’ (2011) 26 Berkeley 
Tech. L. J. 1409-1456; Peter Schaar, ‘Privacy by Design’ (2010) 3(2) Identity in the Information 
Society 267-274. See also Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 07/2013 on the 
Data Protection Impact Assessment Template for Smart Grid and Smart Metering Systems (‘DPIA 
Template’) prepared by Expert Group 2 of the Commission’s Smart Grid Task Force’ (2013) 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2013/wp209_en.pdf accessed 27 February 2014; Article 29 Data Protection 
Working Party, ‘Opinion 9/2011 on the revised Industry Proposal for a Privacy and Data 
Protection Impact Assessment Framework for RFID Applications’ (2011) 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2011/wp180_en.pdf accessed 27 February 
2014; Woodrow Hartzog and Frederic Stutzman, ‘Obscurity by Design’ (2013) 88 Wash. L. Rev. 
385, 397; Federal Trade Commission, ‘Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change. 
Recommendations for Business and Policymakers’ (2012) 22-24 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-report-
protecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf 
accessed 25 June 2014. 
15 See Helene Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context. Technology, Policy, and the Integrity of Social 
Life (Stanford University Press 2010) (it should be noted that the main aspects of the context-
based approach suggested by the author are already existing in the European legal framework on 
data protection); Solove, Understanding Privacy (n 11) 69-70; Robert C. Post, ‘The Social 
Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort’ (1989) 77 (5) Cal. L. 
Rev. 957, 980-981. 
16  See Cynthia Dwork, ‘The Promise of Differential Privacy. A Tutorial on Algorithmic 
Techniques’ in Proceedings of the 52nd Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer 
Science (FOCS 2011) http://research.microsoft.com/apps/pubs/default.aspx?id=155617 accessed 
27 February 2014; Cynthia Dwork, Guy N. Rothblumy and Salil Vadhanz, ‘Boosting and 
Differential Privacy’ in Proceedings of the 51st Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of 
Computer Science (FOCS 2010) http://research.microsoft.com/pubs/155170/dworkrv10.pdf 
accessed 27 February 2014; Cynthia Dwork, ‘Differential Privacy’ in Proceedings of the 33rd 
International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming, part II (ICALP 2006) 
(Springer Verlag 2006), 1-12 http://research.microsoft.com/apps/pubs/default.aspx?id=64346 
accessed 27 February 2014; Ilya Mironov, Omkant Pandey, Omer Reingold, and Salil Vadhan, 
‘Computational Differential Privacy’ in Thomas Beth, Norbert Cot, and Ingemar Ingemarsson 
(eds), Advances in Cryptology. CRYPTO `09’ (Springer-Verlag 2009) 126-142 
http://people.seas.harvard.edu/~salil/research/CompDiffPriv-crypto.pdf accessed 25 June 2014. 
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proposals adopt a holistic approach to the problem. In contrast, this article 
suggests the adoption of different solutions for situations in which the role of the 
consent-based model is outdated (e.g. Big Data). These situations should be 
distinguished from the different contexts in which the traditional model based on 
self-determination can be preserved. 
In doing so, the experience from the past should not be forgotten. In many 
cases, the first answer given by the legal system to new technological and social 
revolutions18 is represented by the introduction of new ad hoc rules. Nevertheless, 
the lack of knowledge of past experiences makes it difficult to find adequate 
answers to the new questions that technology poses.  
From this perspective, this article reconsiders the evolution of data protection 
and the role played by the data subject from mainframe to Big Data, in order to 
identify and clarify the rationale of the “notice and consent” paradigm and to give 
an answer to the contemporary problems of data protection.  
In the light of the above, the first part of this article19 deals with the rationale of 
the first generations of data protection regulations, in which there was no place for 
the notice and consent model, and then focuses on the changing of paradigm 
adopted by the following generations of regulations, in which the “notice and 
consent” model play an important role. The analysis points out the relationship 
between awareness, concentration of power over information and enhancement of 
data subjects’ self-determination.  
The second part of the article 20  focuses on the present Big Data era and 
considers the different aspects, briefly mentioned above, that caused the crisis of 
the traditional model. 
The analysis of the past experiences and the existing similarities between the 
context of the 50’s-60’s and the present can offer elements to address the new 
challenges and to reconsider the data protection framework.  
Nevertheless, a complete picture of the future legal framework of consumer 
data protection is difficult to produce for a number of factors: the complexity of 
the topic; the fact that Big Data applications are in their infancy; the impact that 
policy makers will have in defining regulations and their differing approaches.21 
Moreover, the use of Big Data analytics covers a wide range of different 
                                                                                                                                                               
17 See Cate and Mayer-Schönberger, ‘Data Use and Impact. Global Workshop’ (n 9). 
18 See Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, (n 3). 
19 See below at paras. 2 and 3. 
20 See below at paras. 4 and 5. 
21 See PGDPR; PGDPR-LIBE; The White House, ‘A Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked 
World: A Framework for Protecting Privacy and Promoting Innovation in the Global Digital 
Economy’ (n 5); The White House, ‘Executive Office of the President. Big Data: Seizing 
Opportunities, Preserving Values’ (n 5) 17-21, 55-57, 60-61; OECD, ‘The OECD Privacy 
Framework’ (2013) http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecd_privacy_framework.pdf accessed 27 
February 2014; Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation, ‘Privacy Framework’ (2005) 
https://cbprs.blob.core.windows.net/files/APEC%20Privacy%20Framework.pdf accessed 27 
February 2014. See also the Cross Border Privacy Rules (CBPR) system adopted by the Asian-
Pacific Economic Cooperation, available at http://www.cbprs.org/ accessed 27 February 2014. 
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situations, characterized by conflicting interests, which require ad hoc guidelines 
and solutions.  
For the above reasons, the definition of this new legal framework is outside the 
scope of an academic article. Furthermore this definition should involve policy 
makers and stakeholders in a wide debate. Nevertheless, it is possible and 
necessary to clarify the interests that should be taken into consideration and 
provide an initial outline of the limits and general principles for the re-definition 
of the legal framework on consumer data protection.  
In light of the above, the following paragraphs provide further considerations 
for the debate rather than a definitive solution to the problem.   
 
 
2. The reasons of data protection. The first generations of regulations  
Before considering the different reasons that induce the law to protect personal 
information, it should be noted that European legal systems do not recognize the 
same broad notion of the right to privacy that exists in U.S. case laws. At the same 
time, data protection laws in the European countries do not draw their origins 
from the European idea of privacy and its related case law. 
With regard to the notion of right to privacy (and in brief), in the U.S. the right to 
privacy covers a broad area that goes from informational privacy to the right of 
self-determination in private life decisions. 22  On the other hand, in European 
countries this right mainly focuses on the first aspect and is related to the activities 
of the media. 
With regard to the origins of data protection in Europe, it is worth pointing out 
that the European data protection regulations, since their origins in the late 60’s, 
have focused on the information regarding individuals, without distinguishing 
between their public or private nature.23 The right to privacy and data protection 
do not concern the same aspects, even if they are entangled and connected in 
many senses. There is only a partial overlapping, given that private facts are also 
referred to individuals. At the same time, a lot of personal information is publicly 
available and, for this reason, it does not fall into the field of the right to privacy. 
However, the legal issues related to the protection of personal information had a 
more recent recognition in law, both in the U.S. and Europe.24 This dates from the 
                                                          
22 See Richard S. Murphy, ‘Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defense of 
Privacy’ (1996) 84 Geo.L.J. 2381; William A Parent, ‘A New Definition of Privacy for the Law’ 
(1983) 2(3) Law & Phil. 305; Diane L. Zimmerman, ‘Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to 
Warren and Brandeis's Privacy Tort’ (1983) 68 Cornell L. Rev. 296, 299; Raymond Wacks, ‘The 
Poverty of “Privacy”’ (1980) 96 L.Q.R. 73, 77-78; Raymond Wacks, The Protection of Privacy 
(Sweet & Maxwell, 1980) 10; Luis Henkin, ‘Privacy and Autonomy’ (1974) 74(8) Colum. L. Rev. 
1419. 
23 See Luiz Costa and Yves Poullet, ‘Privacy and the regulation of 2012’ in this Review (2012), 
vol. 28, issue 3, 255. 
24 See fn. 3. See also Paul M. Schwartz, ‘The E.U.-US Privacy Collision: A Turn to Institutions 
and Procedures’ (2013) 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1966, 1969-1992.  
This is a pre-print version of the article appearing in “The Computer Law and Security Review”. This version 
is distributed for non-commercial purposes (http://www.elsevier.com/journals/computer-law-and-security-
review/0267-3649/guide-for-authors). 
 
60’s, whereas the primitive era of the right to privacy was at the end of 19th 
century, when the penny press assumed a significant role in limiting the privacy of 
the people of upper classes.25 For these reasons, our analysis should start from the 
computer revolution of the late  50’s and not one century before, when the first 
decision on informational privacy were adopted in Europe,26 independently from 
the U.S. legal doctrine and before the milestone article of Warren and Brandeis.27 
The first generations of data protection regulations were characterized by a 
national approach. Regulations were adopted at different times and were different 
in the extension of the protection they provided and the remedies they offered.  
The notion of data protection was originally based on the idea of control over 
information, as demonstrated by the literature of that period.28 At that time, the 
migration from dusty paper archives to computer memories was a Copernican 
revolution which, for the first time in history, permitted the aggregation of 
information about every citizen previously spread over different archives.29 For 
this reason, the first regulations represented the answers given by legislators to the 
rising concern of citizens about social control as the introduction of big 
mainframe computers gave governments30 and large corporations the opportunity 
to collect and manage large amount of personal information.31  
In that period, people were afraid of being visible like a goldfish in a glass bowl:32 
a concentration of information, which was massive for the time, was in the hands 
of few entities, which were able to support the investments required by the new 
mainframe equipment. This concentration was also induced by the centralized 
architecture of mainframes. They had a single central processing unit and a main 
memory in which all the computational power was placed and made available to 
other specialized terminals, which were connected to the central unit by cables. 
                                                          
25 See Michael Schudson, Discovering the News. A Social History of American Newspaper 
(Basic Books 1978) 12-60. See also below at n. 26 and 27. 
26 See Trib. civ. Seine, 16 June 1858, in D.P., 1858.3.62. 
27 See Samuel D. Warren and Luis D. Brandeis, ‘The Right to Privacy’ (1890) 4(5) Harv. L. 
Rev. 193-220. 
28  See Westin (n 4), 158-168, 298-326; Adam C. Breckenridge. The Right to Privacy 
(University of Nebraska Press 1970) 1-3. See also Solove, Understanding Privacy (n 11) 4-5. See 
also above at n. 4 and below at n. 32. 
29  See Secretary's Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems, ‘Records, 
Computers and the Rights of Citizens’ (1973) http://epic.org/privacy/hew1973report/ accessed 27 
February 2014 (“A persistent source of public concern is that the Social Security number will be 
used to assemble dossiers on individuals from fragments of data in widely dispersed systems”). 
30 Miller (n 11) 54-67; Mayer-Schönberger (n 7) 221-225. 
31 See Colin J. Bennett, ‘Regulating Privacy: Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and 
the United States’ (Cornell University Press 1992) 29-33, 47; Mayer-Schönberger (n 7) 221-222. 
32 See Myron Brenton, The Privacy Invaders (Coward-McCann 1964); Vance Packard, The 
Naked Society (David McKay 1964); Miller (n 11), chs 1 and 2. See Secretary's Advisory 
Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems (n 29) (“In more than one opinion survey, 
worries and anxieties about computers and personal privacy show up in the replies of about one 
third of those interviewed. More specific concerns are usually voiced by an even larger 
proportion”). See also Mayer-Schönberger (n 7) 223. See also Lee A. Bygrave, Data Protection 
Law. Approaching Its Rationale, Logic and Limits (Kluwer Law International 2002), 107-112. 
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The solution given by the legal systems was the opportunity to have a sort of 
counter-control over the collected data. 33 The purpose of the regulations was not 
to spread and democratize power over information, but to increase the level of 
transparency about data processing and guarantee the right to access to 
information. Citizens felt they were monitored and the law gave them the 
opportunity to know who controlled them, which kind of data were collected and 
for which purposes.  
Technically speaking, the mandatory notification of new databases to independent 
authorities, registration and licensing procedures34 were the fundamental elements 
of these new regulations. They were necessary in order to know who had control 
over information and to monitor data processing. Another key component of the 
first legal frameworks was the rights to access, which allowed citizens to ask the 
data owners about the way in which the information was used and, consequently, 
about their exercise of power over information. Finally, the entire picture was 
completed by the creation of ad hoc public authorities, to guarantee the respect 
and enforcement of citizen’s rights, control over the data owners and reaction 
against abuses.  
In this model there was no space for individual consent, due to the economic 
context of that period.  
The collection of information was mainly made by public entities for purposes 
related to public interests, so it was mandatory and there was no space of 
autonomy in terms of negotiation about personal information. At the same time, 
personal information did not have an economic value for the private sector. The 
data about clients and suppliers were mainly used for operational functions 
regarding the execution of the activities of the company.  
Nevertheless, there was also another element that contributed to exclude the role 
of self-determination: the lack of knowledge, the extreme difficulty for ordinary 
people to understand how the mainframes worked. The computer mainframes 
were a sort of modern god, with sacral attendants, a selected number of 
technicians that was able to use this new equipment. In this scenario, it did not 
make sense to give citizens the chance to choose, since they were unable to 
understand the way in which the date was processed. 
Finally, it is worth pointing out that all these aspects (concentration of 
information, centralised architecture, complexity of data processing) are now 
present again in the Big Data context, hence the practical relevance of this past 
experience.35 
 
 
                                                          
33 See Secretary's Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems (n 29). See also 
Viktor Mayer-Schönberger (n 7) 223. 
34 See Mayer-Schönberger (n 7) 223 and, on the extent of the licensing rules, Lee A. Bygrave, 
Data Privacy Law. An International Perspective (OUP 2014), 183-184. 
35 See below at paras. 4 and 5. 
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3. The economic value of personal information: the new generations of 
regulations 
The following period – from the mid 70’s to the 90’s – can be considered as the 
era of distributed computers, in which a lot of people bought a personal computer 
to collect and process information. The big mainframe computers “became” the 
small desktop personal computers, with a relatively low cost. Consequently, the 
computational capacity was no longer an exclusive privilege of governments and 
big companies, but became accessible to many other entities and individual 
consumers. 
This period witnessed another transformation involving direct marketing, which 
was no longer based on the concept of mail order and moved towards 
computerized direct marketing solutions. 36  The new forms of marketing were 
based on customer profiling and required extensive data collection to apply data 
mining software. The main purpose of profiling was to suggest a suitable 
commercial proposal to any single consumer. This was an innovative application 
of data processing driven by new purposes. Information was no longer collected 
to support supply chains, logistics and orders, but to sell the best product to single 
users. As a result, the data subject became the focus of the process and personal 
information acquired an economic and business value, given its role in sales. 
These changes in the technological and business frameworks created new requests 
from society to legislators since citizens wanted to have the chance to negotiate 
their personal data and gain something in return.  
Although the new generations of the European data protection laws placed 
personal information in the context of fundamental rights37, the main goal of these 
regulations was to pursue economic interests related to the free flow of personal 
data. This is also affirmed by the Directive 95/46/EC,38 which represents both the 
general framework and the synthesis of this second wave of data protection 
                                                          
36  Although direct marketing has its roots in mail order services, which were based on 
personalized letter (e.g. using the name and surname of addressees) and general group profiling 
(e.g. using census information to group addressees in social and economic classes), the use of 
computer equipment increased the level of manipulation of consumer information and generated 
detailed consumer’s profiles. See Lisa A. Petrison, Robert C. Blattberg and Paul Wang, ‘Database 
Marketing. Past, Present, and Future’ (1997) 11 (4) J. Direct Marketing 109, 115-119 (“During the 
decade, companies not only learned their customer’s names and addresses, they also began to 
collect detailed personal and purchasing information, thereby beginning to understand them as 
individuals rather than as part of a traditional mass audience”); Daniel J. Solove, ‘Privacy and 
Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy’ (2001) 53(6) Stan. L. Rev. 
1393, 1405-1407. 
37  See Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data, opened for signature on 28 January 1981 and entered into 
force on 1st October 1985 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=108&CL=ENG accessed 27 
February 2014; OECD, Annex to the Recommendation of the Council of 23rd September 1980: 
Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data 
http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransborderflo
wsofpersonaldata.htm#preface accessed 27 February 2014. 
38 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on 
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data [1995] OJ L281/31. 
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laws39. Nevertheless the roots of data protection still remained in the context of 
personality rights and, for this reason, the European approach is less market-
oriented 40  than in other legal systems. The Directive also recognizes the 
fundamental role of public authorities in protecting data subjects against unwilled 
or unfair exploitation of their personal information for marketing purposes. 
Both the theoretical model of fundamental rights, based on self-determination, and 
the rising data-driven economy highlighted the importance of user consent in 
consumer data processing41. Consent does not only represent an expression of 
choice with regard to the use of personality rights by third parties, but is also an 
instrument to negotiate the economic value of personal information.42  
In this new data-driven economy, personal data cannot be exploited for business 
purposes without any involvement of the data subject. It is necessary that data 
subjects become part of the negotiation, since data is no longer used mainly by 
government agencies for public purposes, but also by private companies with 
monetary revenues.43 
Nevertheless, effective self-determination in data processing, both in terms of 
protection and economic exploitation of personality rights, cannot be obtained 
without adequate and prior notice44.  
For these reasons, the “notice and consent” model45 has added a new layer to the 
existing paradigm based on transparency and access. 
                                                          
39 The EU Directive 95/46/EC has a dual nature, since it was written on the basis of the 
existing national data protection laws, in order to harmonize them, but at the same time it also 
provided a new set of rules. See the recitals in the preamble to the Directive 95/46/EC. See also 
Yves Poullet, ‘EU data protection policy. The Directive 95/46/EC: Ten years after’ in this Review 
(2006), vol. 22, issue 3, 206, 207; Spiros Simitis, ‘From the Market to the Polis: The EU Directive 
on the Protection of Personal Data’ (1995) 80 Iowa L. Rev. 445. 
40  On the different approach based on granting individuals property rights in personal 
information, see Paul M. Schwartz, ‘Property, Privacy and Personal Data’ (2004) 117(7) Harv. L. 
Rev. 2055; Pamela Samuelson, ‘Privacy as Intellectual Property?’ (2000) 52(5) Stan. L. Rev. 
1125; Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books 1999). For criticism, 
see Julie E. Cohen, ‘Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as an Object’ (2000) 
52 Stan. L. Rev. 1373. 
41 See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2010/C 83/02), art. 8 [2010] 
C83/389. See also  Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v Telefónica de España SAU, 
C-275/06, paras. 63-64 http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&jur=C,T,F&num=C-
275/06&td=ALL accessed 27 February 2014; Federal German Constitutional Court 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht), 15 December 1983 (n 4). Among the legal scholars, see also 
Schwartz, ‘The E.U.-US Privacy Collision: A Turn to Institutions and Procedures’ (n 24); Maria 
Tzanou, ‘Data protection as a fundamental right next to privacy? ‘Reconstructing’ a not so new 
right’ (2013) 3 (2) Int’l Data Privacy L. 88 ss.; Daniel J. Solove, ‘Introduction: Privacy Self-
Management and the Consent Dilemma’ (n 5). See also above at n 4. 
42 But see Alessandro Acquisti and Jens Grossklags, ‘Privacy and rationality in individual 
decision making’ (2005) 3(1) Security & Privacy, IEEE, 26–33. 
43 See OECD, ‘Exploring the Economics of Personal Data: A Survey of Methodologies for 
Measuring Monetary  Value’ (n 1); European Data Protection Supervisor, ‘Preliminary Opinion of 
the European Data Protection Supervisor. Privacy and competitiveness in the age of big data: The 
interplay between data protection, competition law and consumer protection in the Digital 
Economy’ (2014) 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consultation/Opi
nions/2014/14-03-26_competitition_law_big_data_EN.pdf accessed 27 February 2014. 
44 The notice describes how the data is processed and the detailed purposes of data processing. 
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Finally, it is important to highlight that during the 80’s and 90’s data analysis 
increased in quality, but its level of complexity was still limited. Consequently, 
consumers were able to understand the general correlation between data collection 
and related purposes of data processing (e.g. profiling users, offering customized 
services or goods). Clearly, at that time, informed consent and self-determination 
were largely considered as synonyms. This changed in the Big Data era. 
 
 
4. The future generation of regulations in the Big Data era 
The present Big Data era is different from the previous period both in terms of 
economic and technological context, with direct consequences on the adequacy of 
the legal framework adopted to protect personal information.  
The new environment is mainly digital and characterized by an increasing 
concentration of information in the hands of a few entities, both public and 
private. The role played by specific subjects in the generation of data flows is the 
main reason for this concentration. Governments and big private companies (e.g. 
large retailers,  telecommunication companies, etc.) collect huge amounts of data 
while performing their daily activities. This bulk of information represents a 
strategic and economically relevant asset, since the management of large 
databases enables these entities to assume the role of gatekeepers with regard to 
the information that can be extracted from the datasets. They are able to keep 
information completely closed or to limit access to the data, perhaps to specific 
subjects only or to circumscribed parts of the entire collection. 
Not only governments and big private companies acquire this power, but also the 
intermediaries in information flows (e.g. search engines,46 Internet providers, data 
brokers, 47 marketing companies), which do not generate information, but play a 
key role in circulating it. 
                                                                                                                                                               
45 See arts 2 (h), 7 (a) and 10, Directive 95/46/EC. See also Article 29 Data Protection Working 
Party, ‘Opinion 15/2011 on the definition of consent’ (n 8) 5-6. With regard to personal 
information collected by public entities, the Directive 95/45/EC permits the data collection without 
the consent of data subject in various cases; however, the notice to data subjects is necessary in 
these cases. See arts 7, 8 and 10, Directive 95/46/EC. See also Christopher Kuner, ‘The European 
Commission’s Proposed Data Protection Regulation: A Copernican Revolution in European Data 
Protection Law’ (2012) 11 Privacy & Sec. L. Rep., 1, 5. 
46  See also Betsy Sparrow, Jenny Liu, Daniel M. Wegner, ‘Google Effects on Memory: 
Cognitive Consequences of Having Information at Our Fingertips’ (2011) Science 776-778. 
Published online 14 July 2011. doi: 10.1126/science.1207745. This study suggests that when 
people expect to have future access to information, they have lower rates of recall of the 
information itself and enhanced recall instead for where to access it. In a world in which the main 
part of collective information and knowledge are migrating to the online environment, this 
adaptation of the processes of human memory to the advent of new computing and communication 
technology increases the power of the gatekeeper of the information in the ICT context and mainly 
the role of search engines. See also Attila Marton, Michel Avital, and Tina Blegind Jensen, 
‘Reframing Open Big Data’ in ECIS 2013 Proceedings (AISeL 2013). 
47 See Federal Trade Commission, ‘Data brokers. A Call for Transparency and Accountability’ 
(n 3);  
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There are also different cases in which information is accessible to the public, 
both in raw and processed form. This happens with regard to open data sets made 
available by government agencies, information held in public registries, data 
contained in reports, studies and other communications made by private 
companies and, finally, online user-generated contents, which represent a relevant 
and increasing portion of the information available online. 
The concurrent effect of all these different sources only apparently diminishes the 
concentration of power over information, since access to information is not 
equivalent to knowledge. 48  A large amount of data creates knowledge if the 
holders have the adequate interpretation tools to select relevant information, to 
reorganize it, to place the data in a systematic context and if there are people with 
the skills to define the design of the research and give an interpretation to the 
results generated by Big Data analytics.49 
Without these skills, data only produces confusion and less knowledge in the end, 
with information interpreted in an incomplete or biased way. 
For these reasons, the availability of data is not sufficient in the Big Data 
context. 50  It is also necessary to have the adequate human 51  and computing 
resources to manage it. In this scenario, control over information does not only 
regard limited access data, but can also concern open data, 52 over which the 
information intermediaries create an added value by means of their instruments of 
analysis.  
Given that only few entities are able to invest heavily in equipment and research, 
the dynamics described above enhance the concentration of power over 
information, which increases due to the new expansion of Big Data. 
                                                                                                                                                               
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, ‘A Review of the Data Broker 
Industry: Collection, Use, and Sale of Consumer Data for Marketing Purposes’ (2013) 
http://consumercal.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/senate_2013_data_broker_report.pdf accessed 
20 February 2014; Nissenbaum (n 15) 79. 
48 See Michael Gurstein, ‘Open data: Empowering the empowered of effective data use for 
everyone?’ (2011) 16(2)First Monday 
http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/3316/2764 accessed 4 September 2013. 
49  See The Aspen Institute, The Promise and Perils of Big Data (2010) 13 
http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/pubs/The_Promise_and_Peril_of_Bi
g_Data.pdf accessed 27 February 2014 (“As a large mass of raw information, Big Data is not self-
explanatory”); danah boyd and Kate Crawford, ‘Critical Questions for Big Data: Provocations for 
a Cultural, Technological, and Scholarly’ (2012) 15(5) Inf., Comm. & Soc. 666-668. See also Julie 
E. Cohen, ‘What Privacy is For’ (2013) 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1904, 1924-1925; The White House, 
‘Executive Office of the President. Big Data: Seizing Opportunities, Preserving Values’ (n 5) 7.  
50 See Mayer-Schonberger and Cukier (n 3); Cynthia Dwork and Deirdre K. Mulligan, ‘It’s not 
Privacy and It’s not Fair’ (2013) 66 Stan. L. Rev. Online 35. See also Jannis Kallinikos, ‘The 
Allure of Big Data’ (2012) ParisTech Rev., November 16 
http://www.paristechreview.com/2012/11/16/allure-big-data/ accessed 27 February 2014. 
51 See Science and Technology Options Assessment (n 12) 95; Cohen, ‘What Privacy is For’ (n 
49) 1922-1923. 
52 See Federal Trade Commission, ‘Data brokers. A Call for Transparency and Accountability’ 
(n 3), 13. See also S. Benjamin, R. Bhuvaneswari, and P. Rajan, ‘Bhoomi: ‘E–governance’, or, an 
anti–politics machine necessary to globalize Bangalore?” (2007) 
http://casumm.files.wordpress.com/2008/09/bhoomi-e-governance.pdf accessed 27 February 2014. 
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Under many aspects, this new environment resembles the origins of data 
processing, when, in the mainframe era, technologies were held by a few entities 
and data processing was too complex to be understood by data subjects.  
Could this suggest that, in the future, the scenario will change again in a sort of 
“distributed Big Data analytics”, as it happened in the mid 70’s?53 I believe not.54  
The new “data barons” do not base their position only on expensive hardware and 
software, which may become cheaper in the future. Neither is their position based 
on the growing number of staff with specific skills and knowledge, able to give an 
interpretation to the results of data analytics. The fundamental element of the 
power of “data barons” is represented by the large databases they have. These data 
silos, considered the goldmine of the 21st century, do not have free access, as they 
represent the main or the side-effect of the activities realized by their owners, due 
to the role they play in creating, collecting or managing information. 
For this reason, with regard to Big Data, it seems quite difficult to imagine the 
same process of “democratization” that happened concerning computer equipment 
during the 80’s. The access to the above-mentioned large databases is not only 
protected by legal rights, but it is also strictly related to the peculiar positions held 
by the data holders in their market and to the presence of entry barriers. 
Another aspect that characterizes and distinguishes this new form of concentration 
of control over information is given by the nature of the purposes of data 
collection: data processing is no longer focused on single users (profiling), but it 
increased by scale and it is trying to investigate attitudes and behaviours of large 
groups55 and communities, up to entire countries. The consequence of this large 
scale approach is the return of the fears about social surveillance, which 
characterized the mainframe era.  
It is important to highlight that this new potentially extensive and pervasive social 
surveillance differs from the past, since the modern surveillance is no longer 
realized mainly by intelligence apparatus, which autonomously collects a huge 
amount of information through pervasive monitoring systems. It is the result of 
the interplay between private and public sectors,56 based on a collaborative model 
                                                          
53 See above at para. 3 
54 On the risks related to “democratized big data”, see Woodrow Hartzog and Evan Selinger, 
‘Big Data in Small Hands’ (2013) 66 Stan. L. Rev. Online 81, 84-85. 
55 On group privacy see Luciano Floridi, ‘Open Data, Data Protection, and Group Privacy’ 
(2014) 27(1) Philos. Technol. 1–3; danah boyd, ‘Networked Privacy’ (2012) 10(3/4) Surv. & Soc. 
348-350 (“We need to develop models that position networks, groups, and communities at the 
center of our discussion”); Edward J. Bloustein, ‘Group Privacy: The  Right to Huddle’ (1977) 8 
Rut.-Cam. L. J. 219. 
56 See Colin J. Bennett, Kevin D. Haggerty, David Lyon, Valerie Steeves (eds.) Transparent 
Lives Surveillance in Canada (Athabasca University Press 2014) 55-69 
http://www.aupress.ca/books/120237/ebook/99Z_Bennett_et_al_2014-Transparent_Lives.pdf 
accessed 27 February 2014; Neil M. Richards, ‘The Dangers of surveillance’ (2013) 126 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1934, 1940-41;  Jon D. Michaels, ‘All the President’s Spies: Private-Public Intelligence 
Partnerships in the War on Terror’ (2008) 96(4) California Law Review 901-966; Chris 
Hoofnagle, ‘Big Brother's Little Helpers: How Choicepoint and Other Commercial Data Brokers 
Collect, Process, and Package Your Data for Law Enforcement’ (2003) 29 N.C.J. Int'l L. & Com. 
Reg. 595, 595-597; Simitis, ‘Reviewing privacy in an information society’ (n 13) 707, 726. See 
also Alessandro Mantelero and Giuseppe Vaciago, ‘The "Dark Side" of Big Data: Private and 
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made possible by mandatory disclosure orders, which are issued by courts or 
administrative bodies, and extended to an undefined pool of voluntary or 
proactive collaborations from big companies.57  
In this way, governments obtain information with the indirect “co-operation” of 
the consumers who probably would not have given the same information to public 
entities if requested. Service providers, for example, collect personal data on the 
base of private agreements (privacy policies) with the consent of the user and for 
specific purposes58, but governments exploit this practice by using mandatory 
orders to obtain the disclosure of this information.59 This dual mechanism hides 
from citizens the risk and the dimension of the social control that can be realised 
by monitoring social networks or other services and using Big Data analytics 
technologies.60 
                                                                                                                                                               
Public Interaction in Social Surveillance, How data collections by private entities affect 
governmental social control and how the EU reform on data protection responds’ (2013) Comp. L. 
Rev. Int’l 161-169. 
57 See also Council of Europe, ‘Guidelines for the cooperation between law enforcement and 
internet service providers against cybercrime’ (2008) 
http://www.coe.int/t/informationsociety/documents/Guidelines_cooplaw_ISP_en.pdf accessed 27 
February 2014. 
58 On the existing relationship between data retention and access to personal information by 
government agencies or law enforcement authorities, see Joel Reidenberg, ‘The Data Surveillance 
State in the US and Europe’ (forthcoming) Wake Forest L. Rev. 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2349269 accessed 10 December 2013. 
59 See Ira S. Rubinstein, Gregory T. Nojeim, and Ronald D. Lee, ‘Systematic government 
access to personal data: a comparative analysis’ (2014) 4 (2) Int’l Data Privacy L. 96-119; 
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‘Lawful Interception Capability Requirements’ (2013) Computers & Law 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2309413 accessed 27 February 2014; 
European Parliament, Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy Department C: Citizens’ 
Rights and Constitutional Affairs, Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, ‘National 
Programmes for Mass Surveillance of Personal data in EU Member States and Their Compatibility 
with EU Law’ (2013) 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/it/libe/studiesdownload.html?languageDocument=EN
&file=98290 accessed 27 February 2014. 
60 See European Parliament (2013), ‘Resolution of 4 July 2013 on the US National Security 
Agency surveillance programme, surveillance bodies in various Member States and their impact 
on EU citizens' privacy’ http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
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European Parliament, Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy Department C: Citizens’ 
Rights and Constitutional Affairs, Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, ‘The US National 
Security Agency (NSA) surveillance programmes (PRISM) and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act (FISA) activities and their impact on EU citizens’ (2013) 14-16 
http://info.publicintelligence.net/EU-NSA-Surveillance.pdf accessed 14 December 2013; 
European Parliament, Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy Department C: Citizens’ 
Rights and Constitutional Affairs, Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, ‘National 
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4.1 The crisis of the traditional data protection framework 
In this scenario, the traditional data protection framework defined in the 90’s61 
goes to crisis, since the new technological and economic contexts (i.e. market 
concentration, social and technological lock-ins) undermined its fundamental 
pillars: 62 the purpose specification principle, the use limitation principle,63 and 
the “notice and consent” model. 
The purpose specification and use limitation principles have their roots in the first 
generations of data protection regulations, since they are strictly related to the 
intention of avoiding extensive data collections, which may imply risks in terms 
of social surveillance and control.  
With the advent of the new generation of data protection regulations – during the 
80’s and 90’s –, these principles not only put a limit to data processing, but also 
became key elements of the “notice and consent” model. They define the use of 
personal data made by data controllers, which represents important information 
impacting users’ choice. Nevertheless, the advent of Big Data analytics makes it 
difficult to provide detailed information about the purposes of data processing and 
the expected outputs.  
Since Big Data analytics are designed to extract hidden or unpredictable 
inferences and correlations from datasets, the description of these purposes is 
becoming more and more “evanescent”. This is a consequence of the 
                                                                                                                                                               
Programmes for Mass Surveillance of Personal data in EU Member States and Their Compatibility 
with EU Law’ (n 59) 12-16. See also DARPA, ‘Total Information Awareness Program (TIA). 
System Description Document (SDD), Version 1.1’ (2002) 
http://epic.org/privacy/profiling/tia/tiasystemdescription.pdf accessed 14 December 2013; National 
Research Council, Protecting Individual Privacy in the Struggle Against Terrorists: A Framework 
for Program Assessment. (National  Academies Press 2008) Appendix I and Appendix J; 
Congressional Research Service, ‘CRS Report for Congress. Data Mining and Homeland Security: 
An Overview’ (2008) www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL31798.pdf accessed 14 December 2013. 
61 See the previous paragraph. 
62 See Fred H. Cate, ‘The Failure of Fair Information Practice Principles’, in Jane K. Winn 
(ed.) Consumer Protection in the Age of the ‘Information Economy’ (Ashgate 2006) 343–345, also 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1156972 accessed 27 February 
2014. See also Fred H. Cate and Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, ‘Notice and Consent in a World of 
Big Data. Microsoft Global Privacy Summit Summary Report and Outcomes’ (2012) 
http://www.microsoft.com/en-au/download/details.aspx?id=35596 accessed 27 February 2014; 
Fred H. Cate and Viktor Mayer- Schönberger, ‘Notice and consent in a world of Big Data’ (2013) 
3 (2) Int’l Data Privacy L., 67; Rubinstein (n 9) 2; Solove, ‘Introduction: Privacy Self-
Management and the Consent Dilemma’ (n 5) 1880-1903; Kate Crawford and Jason Schultz, ‘Big 
Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms’ (2014) 55 
B.C.L. Rev. 93, 108 http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol55/iss1/4 accessed 27 June 2014. 
63 See also Paul M. Schwartz, ‘Data Protection Law and the Ethical Use of Analytics’ (2011) 
19-21 
http://www.huntonfiles.com/files/webupload/CIPL_Ethical_Undperinnings_of_Analytics_Paper.p
df accessed 27 February 2014; Mireille Hildebrandt, ‘Slaves to Big Data. Or Are We?’ (2013) 
http://works.bepress.com/mireille_hildebrandt/52 accessed 27 February 2014. 
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“transformative”64 use of Big Data, which makes it often impossible to explain all 
the possible uses of data at the time of its initial collection.65 
These critical aspects concerning the purpose specification limitation have a 
negative impact on the effectiveness of the “notice and consent” model.  
First, the difficulty in defining the expected results of data processing induces 
introducing generic and vague statements in the notices about the purposes of data 
collection. Second, also in the hypothesis of the adoption of long and detailed 
notices, the complexity of data processing in the Big Data environment does not 
offer to users a real chance to understand it and to make their choice.66 
Moreover, this scenario is made worse by the economic, social and technological 
constraints, which definitively undermine the idea of self-determination with 
regard to personal information that represented the core principle of the 
generation of data protection regulations approved during the 80’s and 90’s.67  
As mentioned before, we assisted to an increasing concentration of the 
informational assets, due to the multinational or global nature of some big players 
of the new economy, but also due to merger and acquisition processes, which 
created big companies both in the online and offline markets. In various cases, 
mainly with regard to online services, these large scale trends drastically limit the 
number of the companies that provide specific kind of services, which 
consequently have hundreds of millions of users. This dimension of the dominant 
players also produces social and technological lock-in effects that increase data 
                                                          
64 See Omer Tene and Jules Polonetsky, (n 11). 
65 See also Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 03/2013 on purpose limitation’ 
(2013) 23-27, 45-47 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2013/wp203_en.pdf accessed 27 February 2014; Article 29 Data Protection 
Working Party, ‘Opinion 06/2013 on open data and public sector information ('PSI') reuse’ (2013) 
19-20 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2013/wp207_en.pdf accessed 27 February 2014; European Data Protection 
Supervisor, ‘Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor  on the 'Open-Data Package' of 
the European Commission including a Proposal for a Directive amending Directive 2003/98/EC on 
re-use of public sector information (PSI), a Communication on Open Data and Commission 
Decision 2011/833/EU on the reuse of Commission documents’ (2012) 4-5, 7, 10 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consultation/Opi
nions/2012/12-04-18_Open_data_EN.pdf accessed 27 February 2014. 
66  See Laura Brandimarte, Alessandro Acquisti, and George Loewenstein, ‘Misplaced 
Confidences: Privacy and the Control Paradox’ (2010), Ninth Annual Workshop on the Economics 
of Information Security http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/~acquisti/papers/acquisti-SPPS.pdf accessed 27 
February 2014; Joseph Turow, Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Deirdre K. Mulligan, and Nathaniel Good, 
‘The  Federal Trade Commission and Consumer Privacy in the Coming Decade’ (2007), ISJLP 3, 
723-749 http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/facpubs/935 accessed 27 February 2014; Federal 
Trade Commission, ‘Data brokers. A Call for Transparency and Accountability’ (n 3), 42. On the 
limits of the traditional notices, see also Rayan M. Calo, ‘Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy 
(and Elsewhere)’ (2013) 87(3) Notre Dame L. Rev. 1027, 1050-1055 
http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol87/iss3/3 accessed 27 February 2014; Daniel J. Solove, 
‘Introduction: Privacy Self-management and The Consent Dilemma’ (n 5) 1883-1888; World 
Economic Forum, ‘Unlocking the Value of Personal Data: From Collection to Usage’ (2013) 18 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_IT_UnlockingValuePersonalData_CollectionUsage_Report
_2013.pdf accessed 27 February 2014. 
67 See the previous paragraph. 
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concentration and represents further direct and indirect limitations to consumer’s 
self-determination and choice.68 
 
4.2 Reconsidering the role of user’s self-determination 
In the above-described scenario, characterized by complex data processing and 
concentration of control over information, the decision to maintain a model 
mainly focused on “notice and consent” represents a risk. It is easy for companies 
to give notice and require the consent without an effective self-determination of 
users, given the above-mentioned reasons.69  
This leads us to reconsider the role of user’s self-determination in the situations in 
which consumers are not able to understand deeply data processing and its 
purposes,70 or are not in the position to decide71. There it seems to be an analogy 
between the characters of data processing in the Big Data era and what it 
happened in the mainframe age. Today, data is collected by a limited number of 
entities and consumers are not able to understand purposes and methods of data 
processing, like at the beginnings of computer age.  
In these cases the focus cannot be maintained mainly on the user and his or her 
self-determination: the role played by users should be restricted and conversely 
the role of independent authorities should be increased.72  
Data protection authorities, rather than consumers, have the technological 
knowledge to evaluate the risks associated to data processing and can adopt legal 
remedies to tackle them 73. Furthermore, they are also in the best position to 
balance all the different interests of the various stakeholders with regard to 
extensive projects of data collection and data mining.74 
The suggestion is not to change the entire traditional model of data protection, but 
to reshape it with regard to the Big Data context and the other contexts in which 
                                                          
68 See above at para 1. 
69 See Daniel J. Solove, ‘Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma’ (n 5) 1899. 
70  See The Boston Consulting Group, ‘The value of our digital identity’ (2012) 4, 
http://www.libertyglobal.com/PDF/public-policy/The-Value-of-Our-Digital-Identity.pdf accessed 
27 February 2014. 
71 See also art. 7 (4), PGDPR (“Consent shall not provide a legal basis for the processing, 
where there is a significant imbalance between the position of the data subject and the controller”). 
In 2013, The Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) of the European 
Parliament has dropped the former art. 7 (4), see art. 7 PGDPR-LIBE. 
72 See Bygrave, Data Protection Law. Approaching Its Rationale, Logic and Limits (n 32) 86 
(“the monitoring and enforcement regimes set up by data protection laws are also a mixture of 
paternalistic and participatory control forms”). 
73 See arts. 22, 23, 24 Directive 95/46/EC; Art. 53 and ch. VIII PGDPR-LIBE. See also n. 74. 
74  See, e.g., Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Letter from the Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party addressed to Google regarding the upcoming change in their privacy 
policy’ (2012) http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/other-
document/files/2012/20120202_letter_google_privacy_policy_en.pdf accessed 27 February 2014. 
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asymmetries in data negotiation drastically reduce users’ self-determination.75 In 
the remaining cases, the “notice and consent” model, as traditionally designed, 
can still be effective, although it needs to be reinforced by increasing 
transparency, 76  service provider’s accountability 77  and data protection-oriented 
architectures.78  
It may be argued that an ad hoc regime is not necessary, considering that Big Data 
analytics can be applied to anonymized datasets. Nevertheless, it is worth pointing 
out that anonymity by de-identification is a difficult goal to achieve, 79  as 
demonstrated in a number of studies.80  
                                                          
75 See below at para 5. See also Ryan Calo, ‘Digital Market Manipulation’  (forthcoming 
2014), 82 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2309703 
accessed 4 July 2014. 
76 See art. 13a, PGDPR-LIBE.  See also Lorrie F. Cranor, ‘Necessary but not sufficient: 
standardized mechanisms for privacy and choice’ (n 8) 286-295, 304-307. 
77 See 32a, 33, 33a, 34, 35, 39 PGDPR-LIBE. See also Article 29 Data Protection Working 
Party, ‘Opinion 3/2010 on the principle of accountability’ (2010) 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2010/wp173_en.pdf accessed 27 February 
2014; World Economic Forum, ‘Rethinking Personal Data: A New Lens for Strengthening Trust’ 
(2014) 9 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_RethinkingPersonalData_ANewLens_Report_2014.pdf 
accessed 27 February 2014. 
78 See arts. 23, 32a, 33, PGDPR-LIBE. See also Calo, ‘Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy 
(and Elsewhere)’ (n 66). The article suggests innovative ways to deliver privacy notice, based on 
consumer’s experience of a product or service to warn or inform rather than entirely on words or 
symbols (“visceral notice” in the words of the author, since these notices are drawn upon 
consumer psychology to achieve greater salience). But see Solove, ‘Introduction: Privacy Self-
management and The Consent Dilemma’ (n 5) 1885. 
79  See MIT- CSAIL, ‘Exploring the Future Role of Technology in Protecting Privacy. 
Workshop report’ (2013) 5 
http://bigdata.csail.mit.edu/sites/bigdata/files/u9/MITBigDataPrivacy_WKSHP_2013_finalvWEB.
pdf accessed 15 June 2014. See also Paul M. Schwartz, ‘Data Protection Law and the Ethical Use 
of Analytics’ (n 63) 7 (“dividing line between personally identified information (PII) and non-PII 
can be difficult to trace”). 
80  See Paul Ohm, ‘Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of 
Anonymization’ (2010) 57 UCLA L. Rev. 1701-1777; United States General Accounting Office, 
‘Record Linkage and Privacy. Issues in creating New Federal Research and Statistical 
Information’ (2011) 68-72 http://www.gao.gov/assets/210/201699.pdf accessed 14 December 
2013. See also Hui Zang and Jean Bolot, ‘Anonymization of location data does not work: a large-
scale measurement study’ in Proc. MobiCom '11 Proceedings of the 17th annual international 
conference on Mobile computing and networking (ACM 2011) 145-156; Philippe Golle, 
‘Revisiting the uniqueness of simple demographics in the US population’ in Proc. 5th ACM 
workshop on Privacy in electronic society, (ACM 2006) 77-80; Latanya Sweeney, ‘Simple 
Demographics Often Identify People Uniquely’ (Carnegie Mellon University 2000); Latanya 
Sweeney, ‘Foundations of Privacy Protection from a Computer Science Perspective’ in Proc. Joint 
Statistical Meeting, AAAS, Indianapolis, (AAAS 2000). But cf. Omer Tene and Jules Polonetsky, 
‘Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in the Age of Analytics’ (2013) 11 Nw. J. Tech. & 
Intell. Prop. 239-274. Contra Ann Cavoukian and Khaled El Emam, ‘Dispelling the Myths 
Surrounding De-identification: Anonymization Remains a Strong Tool for Protecting Privacy’ in 
Ann Cavoukian, ‘Privacy by design. From rhetoric to reality’ (n 14) 227-245 (“As long as proper 
de-identification techniques, combined with reidentification risk measurement procedures, are 
used, de-identification remains a crucial tool in the protection of privacy.”); Ann Cavoukian and 
Daniel Castro, ‘Big Data and Innovation, Setting the Record Straight: Deidentification Does 
Work’ (2014) http://www2.itif.org/2014-big-data-deidentification.pdf accessed 15 July 2014, 
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The power of Big Data analytics to draw unpredictable inferences from 
information undermines many strategies based on de-identification 81. In many 
cases a reverse process in order to identify individuals is possible and it is also 
possible to identify those using originally anonymous data.82 Here, it is closer to 
the truth to affirm that each data is a piece of personal information than to assert 
that it is possible to manage data in a de-identified way.83 
A potential solution may be represented by the introduction of specific provisions, 
by law or by contract,84 which forbids any form of re-identification and provides 
ad hoc sanction.85 Nevertheless, this approach solves only partially the problems 
related to Big Data analytics.  
First, in many cases Big Data analytics are used for specific purposes that require 
non anonymous datasets (e.g. profiling, etc.). Second, the exclusion of any prior 
assessment of the risks related to Big Data projects makes difficult to monitor the 
effectiveness of the prohibition of re-identification. A case by case assessment, 
similar to the one suggested above, should be required anyhow, in order to 
provide an adequate enforcement of this prohibition and to assess the adequacy of 
the anonymising processes.  
Finally, anonymity is usually related to single users and in this case it excludes the 
potential negative effect related to data processing, except the risk of re-
identification. Nevertheless, anonymity does not affect group profiling and the 
related issues of non-discrimination or social control. In this sense, Big Data 
analytics make possible to identify patterns in the behaviours of groups86 without 
identifying single individuals and these results can be used by data gatherers in 
order to define potentially invasive and discriminative solutions and policies. 
  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
work’ (2014) http://randomwalker.info/publications/no-silver-bullet-de-identification.pdf accessed 
15 July 2014. 
81 See Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier (n 3) 154-156. See also Paul M. Schwartz and Daniel J. 
Solove, ‘The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Personally Identifiable Information’ 
(2011) 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1841-1845. 
82 See above at n. 80. 
83 See World Economic Forum, ‘Unlocking the Value of Personal Data: From Collection to 
Usage’ (n 66) 12; Rubinstein (n 9) 74, 77-78. 
84 See Ann Cavoukian and Drummond Reed, ‘Big Privacy: Bridging Big Data and the Personal 
Data Ecosystem through Privacy by Design’ in Ann Cavoukian, ‘Privacy by design. From rhetoric 
to reality’ (n 14) 82; Yianni Lagos and Jules Polonetsky, ‘Public vs. Nonpublic Data: The Benefits 
of Administrative Controls’ (2013) 66 Stan. L. Rev. Online 103-109. 
85 See Cate and Mayer‐Schönberger, ‘Data Use and Impact. Global Workshop’ (n 9) 13. See 
also Federal Trade Commission, ‘Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change. 
Recommendations for Business and Policymakers’ (n 14) 21. 
86 See Federal Trade Commission, ‘Data brokers. A Call for Transparency and Accountability’ 
(n 3), 19-20. 
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5. Defining a subset of rules for Big Data analytics and the situations 
characterized by asymmetries in data negotiation 
The context described above and the related observations suggest defining 
specific rules for Big Data uses and the situations characterized by asymmetries in 
data negotiation. 87  
The necessity to distinguish this area seems not to be felt neither by the E.U. 
legislator, in the proposal for a new data protection regulation, nor by the U.S. 
administration, in the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights.88  
Although the E.U. proposal provides various rules that can be useful, it still adopts 
a mainly holistic approach that does not considered autonomously the above-
mentioned situations. This is an approach in which the consent is still “purpose-
limited”89, based on notice and on the opt-in model. 
Conversely, legal scholars and companies propose a different approach, which 
focuses on the use of the data,90 on the risks (of benefits and harms) associated 
with the proposed use and on accountability.91  
This last solution has the undoubted merit to underline the crisis of the traditional 
model 92  and to suggest a solution more suitable to address the issues of the 
existing and future context of data processing.  
Nevertheless, it offers a holistic solution and this “one solution fits all” approach 
does not seem to be consistent with the different existing contexts, since there are 
cases in which the traditional model can still be effective.93 Moreover, applying 
this user-centred model in the Big Data context, it seems to address only partially 
the emerging issues: it adopts a risk analysis mainly focused on data protection 
assessment and security 94 , rather than on a multi-criteria risk-analysis that 
considers also the ethical and social consequences of data processing.95  
                                                          
87 For this reason, the following paragraphs will leave aside the cases in which users are able to 
understand the purposes of data collection and data processing, where the existing “notice and 
choice” and “purpose limited” consent can be kept valid.  
88 See The White House, ‘A Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked World: A Framework for 
Protecting Privacy and Promoting Innovation in the Global Digital Economy’ (n 5) 47-48. See also 
The White House, ‘Executive Office of the President. Big Data: Seizing Opportunities, Preserving 
Values’ (n 5) 61. 
89 See art. 7 (4) PGDPR-LIBE. 
90 See Cate and Mayer‐Schönberger, ‘Data Use and Impact. Global Workshop’ (n 9) 6, 8-9; 
Edith Ramirez, ‘The Privacy Challenges of Big Data: A View From the Lifeguard’s Chair’ 
Technology Policy Institute Aspen Forum Aspen, Colorado (keynote) (2013) 5-6 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/privacy-challenges-big-data-
view-lifeguard%E2%80%99s-chair/130819bigdataaspen.pdf accessed 27 February 2014. 
91 See Cate and Mayer‐Schönberger , ‘Data Use and Impact. Global Workshop’ (n 9) 5, 17-18. 
On privacy harms, see also Rayan M. Calo, ‘The Boundaries of Privacy Harm’ (2011) 86 Ind. L. J. 
1131. 
92 See Cate and Mayer‐Schönberger , ‘Data Use and Impact. Global Workshop’ (n 9) 3-4, 7. 
93 See above at para. 4. 
94 See Cate and Mayer‐Schönberger , ‘Data Use and Impact. Global Workshop’ (n 9) 12-13. 
95 On the contrary, this multi-criteria approach is adopted in the present article, see below in the 
text. See also Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Statement on the role of a risk-based 
approach in data protection legal frameworks’ (2014) http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
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Finally, in this model the assessment is mainly conducted without a significant 
involvement of data protection authorities,96 which conversely play a central role 
in the model here proposed.97  
It is worth observing here that the new issues related to Big Data should not be 
necessarily addressed by making a choice between a “consent based” model and a 
“corporate accountability” model.  
Although Big Data and lock-in effects drastically limit self-determination at the 
moment in which the data is collected, the fundamental right of any person to 
decide about his or her own information cannot be erased and users should have 
the right to be informed about data processing and not to take part of it.  
In this sense, the model here suggested is the result of the past experiences: like in 
the first data protection regulations, the decision about data processing cannot be 
left to users, but at the same time user’s rights to oppose to data processing and 
not to have personal data collected – codified in data protection laws during the 
90’s – should be preserved.  
The fundamental pillars of this model are the definition of a rigorous multiple 
impact assessment of data processing, which should be widely adopted and 
publicly available,98 and the adoption of the “opt-out” scheme. 
It should be noted that the data protection impact assessment does not represent a 
completely new approach to data protection, as the privacy impact assessment 
exists in different experiences around the world and has represented an important 
tool since mid-1990s. 99  Nevertheless, it is necessary to distinguish the data 
                                                                                                                                                               
protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2014/wp218_en.pdf accessed 
27 February 2014 (“The risk-based approach goes beyond a narrow “harm-based-approach” that 
concentrates only on damage and should take into consideration every potential as well as actual 
adverse effect, assessed on a very wide scale ranging from an impact on the person concerned by 
the processing in question to a general societal impact (e.g. loss of social trust)”).  
96 See Cate and Mayer‐Schönberger, ‘Data Use and Impact. Global Workshop’ (n 9), p. 17 
(“after some initial transitional burdens, such an approach is likely to shift more of the burden for 
being accountable for data processing activities away from both regulators and individuals toward 
data users”). See the criticisms expressed by Information Commissioner’s Office, ‘Big data and 
data protection’, Version: 1.0, p. 41 (2014) 
http://ico.org.uk/news/latest_news/2014/~/media/documents/library/Data_Protection/Practical_app
lication/big-data-and-data-protection.pdf accessed 29 June 2014. 
97 See below in text.  
98 This is a critical aspect due to the need to balance the information about data processing 
provided to users and the security and competitive issues of enterprises. In order to balance these 
opposite issues, it is possible to provide business sensitive information in a separate annex to the 
impact assessment report, which will not be made public, or it is possible to publish a short version 
of the report without the sensitive contents. See Alessandro Mantelero, ‘Competitive value of data 
protection: the impact of data protection regulation on online behaviour’ (2013) 3(4) Int’l Data 
Privacy L. 234; Neil M. Richards and Jonathan H. King, ‘Three Paradoxes of Big Data’ (2013) 66 
Stan. L. Rev. Online 41, 43; David Wright, ‘A framework for the ethical impact assessment of 
information technology’ (2011) 13(3) Ethics Inf Technol. 222. See also Recital 51 in the preamble 
to the PGDPR-LIBE.  
99 On the origins of the notion of privacy impact assessment, see Roger Clarke, ‘Privacy impact 
assessment: Its origins and development’ in this Review (2009), vol. 25, issue 2, 123-127; David 
Flaherty, ‘Privacy impact assessments: an essential tool for data protection’ (2000) 7(5) Privacy 
Law and Policy Reporter 85, fn. 3 http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/PLPR/2000/45.html#fn3 
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protection impact assessment from the similar notion of privacy impact 
assessment. Both these assessments are based on the model of risk analysis and 
evaluate ex ante the future impact that a specific services or product could have on 
privacy or data protection, but the concepts of right to privacy and data protection 
are different,100 consequently these assessments investigate different fields that 
are not completely overlapped.  
A significant element of these assessments is the continuity of the evaluation, 
which follows the product and the service during their entire life-cycle, redefining 
the assessment when new features or modifications are introduced. This approach 
reduces the need for the legislator to follow technological developments and 
induces preventive solutions to ensure compliance with the principles of data 
protection. 
With regard to the impact assessment, the same approach that is used in the field 
of product safety and liability (e.g. drugs authorization)101 should be extended to 
data processing: in presence of complex data processing systems or data 
collections influenced by lock-in effects, the risk and benefit assessment should 
not be made by consumers, but it should be made by companies, under the 
supervision of data protection authorities. Consumers should only decide to 
exercise or not their right to opt-out. 102 
These situations, characterized by asymmetries in data negotiation, seem not to be 
considered in the last amended version of the EU proposal103, as demonstrated by 
the erasure of the provision of the proposal of the Commission which stated that 
“consent shall not provide a legal basis for the processing, where there is a 
significant imbalance between the position of the data subject and the 
controller”.104  
On the contrary, the EU Proposal indirectly addresses the issues related to Big 
Data analytics and data protection risk analysis. In this sense, article 32a does not 
mention Big Data, but, in listing the cases in which data protection impact 
                                                                                                                                                               
accessed 27 February 2014. See also David Wright, ‘Should privacy impact assessments be 
mandatory?’ (2011) 54(8) Communications of the ACM 121-131; David H. Flaherty, Protecting 
Privacy in Surveillance Societies: The Federal Republic of Germany, Sweden, France, Canada, 
and the United States (University of North Carolina Press, 1989) 277ff, 405. For a comparative 
analysis of the different regulations on privacy impact assessment, see Roger Clarke, ‘Privacy 
impact assessment: Its origins and development’, 127-129; David Wright,Kush Wadhwa, Paul De 
Hert, and Dariusz Kloza, ‘PIAF A Privacy Impact Assessment Framework for data protection and 
privacy rights’ (2011) 19-184 www.piafproject.eu/ref/PIAF_D1_21_Sept_2011.pdf accessed 27 
February 2014. More in general on privacy impact assessment, see David Wright, ‘The state of the 
art in privacy impact assessment’ in this Review (2012), vol. 28, issue 1, 54; David Wright and 
Paul De Hert (eds), Privacy Impact Assessment (Springer 2012); Roger Clarke, ‘An evaluation of 
privacy impact assessment guidance documents’ (2011) 1(2) Int’l Data Privacy Law 111-120. 
100 See above at para 2. 
101  See Cohen, ‘What Privacy is For’ (n 49) 1925 (“Big Data represents the de facto 
privatization of human subjects research, without the procedural and ethical safeguards that 
traditionally have been required”). 
102 See also Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 06/2014’ (n 8) 45. 
103 See Art. 7 (4) PGDPR-LIBE. See also above at n. 71. 
104 See Art. 7 (4) PGDPR. If the provision had been maintained, the above-suggested approach 
based on prior assessment and opt-out would have represented a possible solution for the provision 
of a legal basis for processing. 
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assessment is required, introduces a new criterion that is represented by the “large 
scale” of data collection.105  
More specifically, the EU Proposal requires a prior assessment when large 
quantities of data is collected for a long period (“more than 5000 data subjects 
during any consecutive 12-month period”) 106 or when there is a “large scale” data 
collection that involves special categories of information or of data subjects.  
Although the Proposal adopts a solution based on risk assessment, this approach 
diverges from that adopted in this article, which is not technologically neutral and 
focuses on the use of Big Data analytics. Moreover, the model here suggested 
grounds on the complexity of data processing rather than on the dimension of 
datasets, the purposes of data processing and the nature of information or of data 
subjects.107 
The solution proposed by the European legislator is in line with the traditional 
approach, which is based on the elements of data processing (nature of the data, 
purposes of data processing, categories of data subjects, period of data processing) 
rather than on the adopted technologies and on the difficulty for the user to 
understand the implications of data processing.  
Nevertheless, given the predictive nature of Big Data and the impossibility to 
define ex ante the “specified” purposes of data processing,108 it seems to be more 
adequate to require a mandatory data protection impact assessment in any cases in 
which these analytics are applied to data sets containing personal information. In 
this sense, the focus is on the tools used to manage the information and the 
dimension of data collection merely represents a necessary corollary. Finally, with 
regard to the dimension of databases, it should also be noted that the border 
between Big Data archives and normal databases is difficult to define.  
The criterion of the threshold value of 5.000 data subjects, which has been 
adopted by the EU Proposal,109 seems to be questionable when considering the 
nature of data or data subjects. The use of Big Data analytics with regard to 
information concerning relatively small groups of subjects with particular 
characteristics (e.g. geographical distribution, occupation, similar preferences or 
behaviours) may have relevant predictive effects and also consequences in terms 
of discrimination or diversity of approaches that can be adopted by data 
processors.110  
                                                          
105 See Art. 32a (2) PGDPR-LIBE. This parameter is added to the traditional criteria of the 
nature of the information processed (e.g. sensitive) and the nature of data subjects (e.g. children, 
employees). 
106 See art. 32a (2) (a), PGDPR-LIBE. 
107 See arts. 32a (2) (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g) and (h); 32a (3) point c; 33 (1), PGDPR-LIBE. 
108 See  art. 6 (1) (b), Directive 95/46/EC and art. 5 (b) PGDPR-LIBE(data shall be “collected 
for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes”). 
109 See art. 32a (2) (a) PGDPR-LIBE. 
110  See Danielle Keats Citron, Frank Pasquale, ‘The Scored Society: Due Process for 
Automated Predictions’ (2014) 89(1) Wash. L. Rev. 1, 5, 14-15; Lior J. Strahilevitz, ‘Toward a 
Positive Theory of Privacy Law’ (2013) 126 Harv. L. Rev. 2010, 2021-2022, 2027-2028; 
Nissenbaum (n 15) 208-210; Richards and King, ‘Three Paradoxes of Big Data’ (n 98), 44; Mayer-
Schönberger and Cukier (n 3) 144; Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 03/2013’ 
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For this reason, the a priori definition of a threshold value of data subjects is 
inadequate and the adoption of the notion of “large scale” (which is also provided 
by the EU Proposal) would appear to be more suitable.111Although it is a less 
definite notion, it induces a case by case analysis of the existing relationship 
between the information contained in a database and the population to which it 
relates. 
In the suggested model, companies  intend to adopt a strategy based on Big Data 
analytics should conduct a prior assessment of the different impacts on data 
protection, social surveillance and discrimination, 112  in order to adopt all the 
adequate measures and standards to reduce them.113  
This multiple assessment, as in clinical trials, should be conducted by third parties 
and supervised by data protection authorities, which should also define the 
professional requirements of these third parties. 114 Once the assessment is 
approved by data protection authorities, the process should be considered secure 
in terms of protection of personal information and social consequences; for this 
reason, companies can enlist all their users in the specific data processing, without 
any prior consent, but giving them a previous notice that mentions the results of 
the assessment115 and providing them the opt-out option. 
It is worth pointing that a prior consultation process is also provided by the EU 
Proposal; 116  nevertheless it differs from the model here suggested, since it is 
restricted to specific cases of data processing, in which the data protection 
assessment is required.117 These cases do not cover all the potential hypotheses in 
                                                                                                                                                               
(n 65); The White House, ‘Executive Office of the President. Big Data: Seizing Opportunities, 
Preserving Values’ (n 5) 7, 45-47, 51-53, 59-60, 64-65; Federal Trade Commission, ‘Data brokers. 
A Call for Transparency and Accountability’ (n 3) 55-56. 
111 See Art. 32a (2) PGDPR-LIBE. 
112  Discrimination should also be considered in terms of exclusion of individuals or 
underrepresented groups or categories. See Kate Crawford, ‘The Hidden Biases in Big Data’ 
(2013) http://blogs.hbr.org/2013/04/the-hidden-biases-in-big-data/ accessed 27 February 2014; 
Jonas Lerman, ‘Big Data and Its Exclusion’ (2013) 66 Stan. L. Rev. Online 55, 56-63. 
113 Following the traditional risk-assessment model, the impact assessment should consider 
each of the different stages of the use of analytics. See also Paul M. Schwartz, ‘Data Protection 
Law and the Ethical Use of Analytics’ (n 63) 16-17 (“Each period of analytics raises different 
kinds of issues for privacy, and, as I will argue below, Fair Information Practices (FIPs) should be 
tailored to make an effective contribution to promoting privacy at all four stages.”); Commission 
nationale de l'informatique et des libertés, ‘Methodology for privacy risk management. How to 
implement the Data Protection Act’ (2012) http://www.cnil.fr/fileadmin/documents/en/CNIL-
ManagingPrivacyRisks-Methodology.pdf accessed 27 February 2014.  
114 See also David Wright, ‘A framework for the ethical impact assessment of information 
technology’ (n 98) 221. 
115 The notice should also describe how to access to the impact assessment report. This report 
is a short version of the documentation related to the assessment and it does not contain corporate 
sensitive information, in order to balance trade secrets and publicity of the assessment. 
Nevertheless, in presence of litigations, courts or data protection authorities may have access to the 
complete documentation and may disclose it to the plaintiff. 
116 See also art. 20, directive 95/46/EC. 
117 As above-mentioned, the data protection assessment is required by the EU Proposal only in 
the cases mentioned in art. 32a (2) (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g) and (h), PGDPR-LIBE and in art. 
32a (3) point c; 33 (1), PGDPR-LIBE. 
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which Big Data analytics may be used.118 Moreover, in the EU Proposal, the prior 
consultation is mainly addressed to data protection officers and data protection 
authorities are involved in the process only “in case a data protection officer has 
not been appointed”.119  
The complexity of the assessments related to the use of Big Data analytics, which 
also involve social and ethical aspects, it is evident. For this reason, these 
assessments cannot be conducted only by experts in data protection law, but 
requires external auditors with specific and multi-disciplinary skills.120 
For this reason, in the suggested model, both the third parties that realize the 
assessment and the data protection authorities, which approve the assessment, 
play a fundamental role in balancing all the different implications of data 
processing.  
Since the balancing test does not focus only on data security, but is a multiple 
assessment that considers also the social impact and ethical use of data121, data 
protection authorities are in the best position to evaluate all the different aspects.  
If it is necessary and in the interest coming from society at large, they may also 
suggest the adequate solutions to make the data processing proposed by 
companies compliant with the above-mentioned issues. 122  In this sense, data 
                                                          
118 Arts. 34 (2) (b), (4), PGDPR-LIBE also provides that the supervisory authorities may define 
the cases in which “it necessary to carry out a prior consultation on processing operations that are 
likely to present specific risks to the rights and freedoms of data subjects by virtue of their nature, 
their scope and/or their purposes, and specified according to paragraph 4”. The following 
paragraph 4 states that the European Data Protection Board “shall establish and make public a list 
of the processing operations which are subject to prior consultation”. In this sense, both the data 
protection authorities and the European Data protection Board may consider the use of Big data 
analytics as a class of operation that require the prior consultation. On the European Data 
protection Board, see ch. VII, s. 3 of the EU Proposal (PGDPR-LIBE). 
119 See Art. 34, PGDPR-LIBE. On the data protection officer, see arts. 35, 36 and 37, PGDPR-
LIBE. 
120 It is worth pointing out that the social and ethical assessments are similar to the data 
protection impact assessment in their nature, since they are prior assessments based on risk 
analysis. Nevertheless, in these cases, the wide range of interests that should be considered 
requires the involvement of different stakeholders and experts. 
121 See Paul M. Schwartz, ‘Data Protection Law and the Ethical Use of Analytics’ (n 63) 22-26; 
David Wright, ‘A framework for the ethical impact assessment of information technology’ (n 98) 
199–226, which pointed out that “a prescriptive ethical guidance is problematic because contextual 
factors influence the ethics” and, consequently, an ethical impact assessment would be more 
appropriate than prescriptive rules. In order to define the values that serve as an ethical guidance, 
the author considers the Lisbon Treaty, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. See 
also Floridi, The 4TH Revolution. How the Infosphere is Reshaping Human Reality (n 2) 189-190; 
Nissenbaum (n 15) 231; Rayan M. Calo, ‘Consumer Subject Review Boards: A Thought 
Experiment’ (2013) 66 Stan. L. Rev. Online 97, 101-102. September 3, 2013; Cynthia Dwork and 
Deirdre K. Mulligan, ‘It’s not Privacy and It’s not Fair’ (n 50) 38; Bjørn Hofmann, ‘On value-
judgments and ethics in health technology assessment’ (2005) 3 Poiesis & Prax. 277, 288-292. See 
also Barbara Skorupinski and Konrad Ott, ‘Technology assessment and ethics Determining a 
relationship in theory and practice’ (2002) 1 Poiesis Prax. 95, 102-107; Neil M. Richards and 
Jonathan H. King, ‘Three Paradoxes of Big Data’ (n 98) 46. On the “social acceptability” of data 
processing, see also Bygrave, Data Protection Law. Approaching Its Rationale, Logic and Limits 
(n 32) 61-62, 339; Cohen, ‘What Privacy is For’ (n 49) 1925-26. 
122  See Paul Ohm, ‘The Underwhelming Benefits of Big Data. In response to Paul M. 
Schwartz, Information Privacy in the Cloud’ (2013) 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. Online 339, 345-346. 
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protection authorities can also involve in the assessment process the different 
stakeholders interested to the specific project of data processing and can audit 
them.123  
A different assessment exclusively based on the adoption of security standards or 
corporate self-regulation would not have the same extent and independency. This 
does not mean that forms of standardization or co-regulation cannot be adopted;124 
nevertheless, the proposed reduction of the role of user’s self-determination (opt-
out) should have a necessary counterbalance in the active role of public and 
independent authorities acting in the interest of the whole society 
The adequacy of this model is also empirically demonstrated by the most 
important cases in which data processing projects had social and ethical impacts. 
With regard to innovative products, services and business solutions, the initiative 
to evaluate their impact on data protection and on society did not come from data 
subjects, but from data protection authorities, which understood the potential risks 
related to these innovations. 125 Only these authorities were in the position to 
suggest the measures to be adopted by companies to reduce these risks, on the 
basis of balancing tests that placed data protection in the more general framework 
of the rights of the individual, as a single and as a member of a democratic 
society. 
A significant element of these assessments is the continuity of the evaluations, 
which follow the product and the service during their entire life-cycle. For this 
reason, it is necessary to update each assessment (data protection assessment, 
social and ethical assessment) when new features or modifications are introduced. 
Moreover, changes with a significant impact on the existing data processing 
should require a specific authorization by data protection authorities.  
Obviously the entire system works only if the political and financial autonomy of 
data protection authorities, both from governments and corporations, is 
guaranteed.126  
For this reason, a model based on mandatory fees, paid by companies when they 
submit their requests of authorization to data protection authorities, would be 
                                                          
123 See also David Wright, ‘A framework for the ethical impact assessment of information 
technology’ (n 98) 201-202, 215-220; Danielle Keats Citron, ‘Technological Due Process’ (2008) 
85(6) Wash. U. L. Rev. 1249, 1312 http://digitalcommons.law.wustl.edu/lawreview/vol85/iss6/2 
accessed 27 February 2014. 
124 See Calo, ‘Consumer Subject Review Boards: A Thought Experiment’ (n 121). 
125 See inter alia Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (2013). Letter to Mr. Larry Page, 
Chief Executive Officer http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/other-
document/files/2013/20130618_letter_to_google_glass_en.pdf accessed 27 February 2014; Irish 
Data Protection Commissioner (2012). Facebook Ireland Ltd. Report of Re-Audit 
http://dataprotection.ie/documents/press/Facebook_Ireland_Audit_Review_Report_21_Sept_2012.
pdf accessed 27 February 2014; Italian Data Protection Authority (2013). Injunction and Order 
Issued Against Google Inc. http://www.garanteprivacy.it/web/guest/home/docweb/-/docweb-
display/docweb/3133945 accessed 27 February 2014. 
126  See also FRA – European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, ‘Access to data 
protection remedies in EU Member States’ (2013) 53 http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra-
2014-access-data-protection-remedies_en_0.pdf accessed 27 February 2014. See also Simitis, 
‘Reviewing privacy in an information society’ (n 13), 707, 743. 
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preferable. 127  This solution will provide autonomous resources to authorities, 
proportionate to the increased activities of assessment, without being influenced 
by the companies under their surveillance. 
The proposed model should offer clear and public procedures for assessment. 
These procedures undoubtedly represent an economic burden for companies. 
Nevertheless, in case of positive evaluation of data processing projects, these 
procedures allow companies to use data for complex and multiple purposes, 
without the inconvenience of acquiring a specific opt-in choice when data is used 
for new purposes. Companies should only inform users about any changes and 
give them the chance to opt-out. 
From the user’s point of view, on one hand the assessment conducted by the data 
protection authorities gives a guarantee of an effective evaluation of the risks 
related to data processing and, on the other hand, the opt-out allows users to 
receive information about data processing and to decide if they do not want to be 
part of the data collection. 
With regard to the opt-out model, it might be noted that the suggested approach 
undermines the chances for users to negotiate their consent and to earn adequate 
revenues from data controllers. Nevertheless, the strength of this objection is 
reduced by the above-described existing limits to self-determination.  
In the majority of the cases the negotiation is reduced to the alternative “take it or 
leave it”. For these reasons, a prior assessment conducted by independent 
authorities and an opt-out model seem to offer more guarantees to users than an 
apparent, but inconsistent, self-determination based on “notice and consent”128 
and on the opt-in model. 
Finally, in order to facilitate the implementation of the suggested approach, 
technical solutions based on user-oriented infomediaries could be adopted. 129 
                                                          
127 This self-financing model, based on licensing or notification fees, in the past was adopted in 
Sweden and United Kingdom, see Philip Schütz, ‘Comparing formal independence of data 
protection authorities in selected EU Member States. Conference Paper for the 4th Biennial ECPR 
Standing Group for Regulatory Governance Conference 2012’ (2012) 17, fn. 73, and 18 
http://regulation.upf.edu/exeter-12-papers/Paper%20265%20-%20Schuetz%202012%20-
%20Comparing%20formal%20independence%20of%20data%20protection%20authorities%20in
%20selected%20EU%20Member%20States.pdf accessed 27 February 2014. In United Kingdom, 
the Information Commissioner’s Office is still partially funded by notification fees paid by data 
controllers; see Information Commissioner’s Office, ‘Budget 2011-12. Spending plans 2012-13 to 
2014-15’ (2011) 2 
http://ico.org.uk/about_us/boards_committees_and_minutes/~/media/documents/library/Corporate/
Detailed_specialist_guides/ico_budget_2011-12.ashx accessed 27 February 2014. See also the fee-
based model adopted by the European Medicines Agency 
http://www.ema.europa.eu/ema/index.jsp?curl=pages/about_us/general/general_content_000130.js
p&mid=WC0b01ac0580029336 accessed 27 February 2014. 
128 See Cate and Mayer‐Schönberger, ‘Data Use and Impact. Global Workshop’ (n 9) 9 (“The 
existence of a privacy notice and the user’s instant 
And uninformed consent may give the illusion of privacy”). 
129 On the original notion of infomediaries, see John Hagel III and Jeffrey F. Rayport, ‘The 
Coming Battle for Customer Information’ (1997) Harv. Bus. Rev. 53, Reprint 97104 
http://thoughtleaderpedia.com/Marketing-
Library/Quotes/The_Coming_Battle_for_Customer_Information.pdf accessed 27 February 2014 
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These agents are able to mediate between users and third parties companies 
interested in collecting consumers’ personal information: on the basis of pre-
definite consumer’s preferences, infomediaries match single user’s interest, and 
related propensity to share information, with the demand coming from companies 
gathering data.130 
Infomediaries could be involved in negotiations, both in the opt-in and in the opt-
out models, to communicate user’s preferences. In the first case, they will act as 
representative of the data subject and will express his or her consent to data 
processing, notifying immediately to user the identity of data controller, as well as 
the nature and the purposes of data processing. In the second case (opt-out 
model), infomediaries will notify information about data processing to the user 
and his or her right to opt-out; if the data subject exercises this right, these agents 
communicate his or her decision to the data gatherer, making a machine-to-
machine negotiation.131 
 
6. Conclusion 
The analysis of the evolutions of data protection, from mainframe era to the 
present new era of predictive analytics, points out that the new environment 
resembles the origins of data processing. For this reason it is difficult to maintain 
the holistic model of informed consent, adopted in the last decades.132  
Like at the beginnings of computer age, data is collected by a limited number of 
entities and users are not able to understand the purposes and methods of data 
                                                                                                                                                               
(“by connecting information supply with information demand and by helping both parties involved 
determine the value of that information, infomediaries would be building a new kind of 
information supply chain”); John Hangel III and Marc Singer, ‘Unbundling the Corporation’  
(1999) Harv. Bus. Rev., 133-141; Paul M. Schwartz, ‘Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace’ (n 
4) 1685-1687. See also Jacques Bus and Carolyn M.-H. Nguyen, ‘Personal Data Management – A 
Structured Discussion’ in Mireille Hildebrandt, Kieron O’Hara and Michael Waidner (eds.), 
Digital Enlightenment Yearbook 2013. The Value of Personal Data (IOS Press, 2013) 270-287; 
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World Economic Forum, ‘Personal Data: The Emergence of a New Asset Class’ (2011), both 
available at http://www.weforum.org/issues/rethinking-personal-data accessed 27 February 2014; 
Lee A. Bygrave, ‘Electronic Agents and Privacy: A Cyberspace Odyssey 2001’ (2001) 9 (3) Int’l 
J. L. Info. Technol., 275–294. See also the ProjectVRM created by the Berkman Center for 
Internet & Society, available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/research/projectvrm# accessed 27 
February 2014; Mydex, ‘The case for personal information empowerment: The rise of the personal 
data store’ (2010) https://mydex.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/The-Case-for-Personal-
Information-Empowerment-The-rise-of-the-personal-data-store-A-Mydex-White-paper-
September-2010-Final-web.pdf accessed 27 February 2014; Hildebrandt (n 63).  
130 See World Economic Forum, ‘Unlocking the Value of Personal Data: From Collection to 
Usage’ (n 66) 13, 18. 
131 See also Carolyn M.-H.Nguyen, Peter Haynes, Sean Maguire, Jeffrey Friedberg, ‘A User-
Centred Approach to the Data Dilemma: Context, Architecture, and Policy’ in Mireille 
Hildebrandt, Kieron O’Hara and Michael Waidner (eds.), Digital Enlightenment Yearbook 2013 (n 
129) 227-228, 233-238. 
132 See above at para 3. 
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processing. This leads us to reconsider the role of user’s self-determination in data 
processing, as defined in during the 80’s and 90’s, when users are not able to 
understand deeply data processing and its purposes, or are not in the position to 
decide. In these cases, the role of users should be reduced and conversely the role 
of independent authorities should be increased.  
In the Big Data era, data protection authorities, rather than users, have the 
technological knowledge to evaluate the risks associated to data processing133 and 
can adopt adequate measures to reduce them. Furthermore, they are also in the 
best position to balance all the different interests of the various stakeholders with 
regard to extensive projects of data collection and data mining.  
In the light of the above, the article suggests to adopt a subset of rules for Big 
Data and lock-in situations, based on the “opt-out” model and the definition of a 
rigorous multiple risk assessment, which should not only consider data 
processing, but also the social impact and ethical issues related to the use of 
personal information. These assessments should be conducted by third parties and 
supervised by data protection authorities, which can involve in the assessment 
process different stakeholders interested by the project of data processing.  
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